Court Cuts Back Claims In Great Pomegranate Dispute
By Guest Blogger Jay Eckhardt
In a dispute over product labeling and marketing, the Coca-Cola Company avoids liability as a result of its careful compliance with FDA rules. (Also, see Rick's post from last week, regarding Coca-Cola's victory in a dispute over its original formula label found on Coke® Classic.) But pomegranate champion POM Wonderful can still pursue a Lanham Act deceptive advertising claim against the company.
On May 5 the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California issued summary judgment orders that cut out two of POM's claims against Coca-Cola's "Minute Maid Enhanced Pomegranate Blueberry Flavored 100% Juice Blend." (Download a copy of the Central District of California's Order here.)
The court acknowledged that consumers have griped about the emphasis on pomegranate and blueberry in the Minute Maid product labeling and advertising. (See Ken's post about a consumer class action concerning Tropicana's pomegranate blueberry juice blend here.) Still, the court agreed with Coca-Cola that POM could not bring a Lanham Act claim challenging the product name, because the company complied with FDA labeling requirements. The Minute Maid product contains less than one-half of one percent (0.5%) pomegranate and blueberry juice, but the court determined that the name is compliant with FDA rules, which allow for product names that prominently cite ingredients that are less than prominent in volume. Because the label clearly notes that the juice is "flavored" with pomegranate and blueberry juice and that the juice is a "blend" of several juices, the court held that the name complies with applicable FDA regulations (21 C.F.R. §§ 102.33(c) and 101.22(i)(1)(i)).
A second claim raised by POM was thrown out by the court. POM sought restitution under California Business & Professions Code section 17200, which provides a cause of action for "Unfair Competition." The court dismissed this claim because "restitution" has been narrowly interpreted by the California Supreme Court, thus barring POM's claim for recovery of a "lost business opportunity." Among authorities cited for the decision to dismiss this claim, the court reported that POM's similar claims under California's Unfair Competition law, brought against Tropicana and Welch's, have recently been dismissed in separate actions.
A third claim survived Coca-Cola's summary judgment attack. POM may proceed under the Lanham Act to challenge the marketing and advertising for the "blueberry pomegranate" product. The court held that POM may attempt to prove at trial that advertising and marketing actually deceived customers, or that Coca-Cola willfully and intentionally misled customers with the marketing of its product.
As noted from the court's order, Coca-Cola is not the only target of POM's litigation strategy. Other juice makers, Tropicana and Welch's, have been the focus of POM's efforts to defend its niche. Ken reported on POM's challenge to Ocean Spray's pomegranate cranberry juice blend last August, when POM survived Ocean Spray's initial motion to dismiss all claims.
An inspired marketing campaign for POM's products, and its essential ingredient, helped build the pomegranate franchise. It's hard to say whether litigation against advertising and labeling practices of POM's pomegranate competitors will be effective. At the same time, there's no doubt that POM is well aware of the burdens of FDA labeling regulations – the company was one among 17 companies notified by the FDA last February that its product labeling and advertising did not pass muster. The FDA warned POM that its advertising was suspect, based on the health claims made on its web site about the benefits of pomegranate juice.
Court's Decision on CR 12(b)(6) Motion In Zupnik: FFDCA Preemption Under Further Attack and Twombly Ignored
We previously cited the motion to dismiss in Zupnik, et al. v. Tropicana Products, Inc. as an example of good pleading practice in a putative consumer fraud class case. United States District Judge Dale S. Fischer apparently disagreed with our assessment, this week issuing an order denying the motion.
Tropicana’s lead argument was a failure of pleading. Tropicana attacked the complaint both on the basis of Rule 9(b), and under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Twombly. The Twombly decision requires the federal court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to determine whether operative factual allegations are “plausible” and more than simply “conclusory.”
Judge Fischer rejected summarily Rule 9(b) arguments. She completely disregarded Tropicana’s Twombly arguments, failing even to mention the Supreme Court’s decision.
Tropicana also moved to dismiss based on federal preemption. Most of Judge Fischer’s decision is devoted to the preemption argument. She ruled that since California’s Sherman Law is substantively identical to 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) of the FFDCA, the preemption argument fails.
Judge Fischer theorized that even though plaintiffs could not point to anything on Tropicana’s label that violated any FDA regulation, the FDA could bring an enforcement action “to target specific false or misleading labels.” If the FDA can bring that kind of action under 21 U.S.C. § 343(a), plaintiffs, according to Judge Fischer, should also be able to bring a private right of action under the identical California law. Query whether Judge Fischer’s reasoning negates any FFDCA preemption defense to a claim brought under California’s Sherman Act?
Consumer Fraud Claims: Examples of Good and Bad Motion Practices
The Good: Tropicana recently brought a motion to dismiss the Zupnik putative consumer fraud class claims pending against it. Zupnik alleges that Tropicana misled consumers in the promotion of its “Pure 100% Juice Pomegranate Blueberry Flavored Blend of 5 Juices from Concentrate with other Natural Flavors” because its front label did not include pictures of fruits other than pomegranates and blueberries.
Tropicana’s motion, brought under both FRCP 9(b) and 12(b)(6), appears as a good example of how putative consumer class claims can be challenged at the outset of the case. Though we don’t yet know whether Tropicana will be successful, its pleading is a sharp attack on the plaintiff’s complaint and takes advantage of the heightened pleading requirements announced recently by the Supreme Court.
Tropicana moved on the basis that the complaint lacks particularity required under Rule 9(b) (the rule requires pleading of the “particularity of the fraud”). It also challenged whether the plaintiff had any injury in fact or alleged any reliance on particular advertising. Finally, Tropicana argued that Zupnik’s claims were expressly preempted by federal law.
Tropicana cites to Twombly to urge the court to disregard “plaintiffs legal conclusions . . . even when made, as here, in the guise of factual allegations.”
Tropicana also attacks Zupnik’s complaint on the basis that “she got what she paid for.” Tropicana points out that its product sold for far less than juice with a higher level of pomegranate or blueberry juices. Because she got what she paid for (presumably regardless of whether she understood it at the time of purchase), she lacks standing to bring a claim for consumer fraud.
The Bad: Coincidently, in another case involving a putative consumer fraud class claim over depictions of fruits on a label, Judge Gorton of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Wiley v. Gerber Products Company granted Gerber’s motion to transfer to the Southern District of California for consolidation with the Williams case pending in California. (The Williams case was previously discussed in this blog.)
The lesson from Wiley v Gerber: if your strategy is to avoid transfer of venue, think about this when pleading. For example, do not include allegations in the complaint about a nationwide class and the application of different states’ consumer protection laws.
Wiley argued against transfer, contending that the “Court’s familiarity with Massachusetts law, under which several claims are brought weights against transfer.” The problem is that “in her amended complaint, Wiley added several claims under New Jersey state law which only undermines her contention that this Court is especially competent to adjudicate the state laws at issue in this dispute.” Wiley also alleged a nationwide class. The court found that the plaintiff’s choice of forum mattered little when she alleged a nationwide class.
