"I Can't Believe It's Not Implausible" - Iqbal/Twombly Doctrine Does Not Result in Dismissal of Yumul Claims
As our own Ken Odza recently blogged, the plausibility pleading standard articulated by the Supreme Court in the Iqbal and Twombly cases resulted recently in the FRCP 12(b)(6) dismissal of misrepresentation claims against Unilever. That ruling seemed to indicate that consumer fraud claims would be vulnerable to motions for dismissal. However, in an order granting in part and denying in part the defendant’s motion for dismissal in Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California did not apply the plausibility pleading standard as stringently as the court in the Unilever decision, lending some question as to precisely how far Iqbal and Twombly will reach.
In Yumul, the plaintiffs alleged Smart Balance violated the California Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act. These exact same violations were alleged in the Unilever case. In Yumul, the plaintiffs alleged that Smart Balance misled consumers with its marketing of Nucoa margarine as “cholesterol free” and “healthy,” despite the presence of artificial trans fat in the product.
In addressing Smart Balance’s motion for dismissal, the court noted the plaintiffs’ reliance on the delayed discovery exception in support of its assertion that tolling of the statute of limitations was appropriate. Stating the applicable law, the court offered that:
A plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer.
In its order, the court directed the plaintiffs to specify the manner of discovery (how and when the plaintiffs actually discovered the fraud or mistake) within 14 days of the July 30 order in an amended complaint. The court denied Smart Balance’s motion to dismiss on all other grounds. While this is no guarantee of success for the plaintiffs by any means, the decision of the court not to dismiss the allegations in Yumul on the basis of the plausibility pleading standard under Iqbal and Twombly stands as an example of the type of inconsistency we may see as courts attempt to apply the standard. We will continue to closely follow this case.
Strategy to Defeat Consumer Class Claims
As we've discussed previously in this blog, the Supreme Court's plausibility pleading standard, as articulated in the Iqbal and Twombly cases often provides a rapid (and relatively inexpensive) pathway to defeat consumer fraud claims.
At the ACI food regulatory conference last week, we discussed a strategy to take advantage of the plausibility pleading standard in jurisdictions that have liberal class certification standards.
In states where individualized reliance or causation is required to make out consumer fraud or unfair trade practices claims, defendants’ first line of attack may be class certification. But where individualized reliance and/or causation is not required, courts will often deny class certification under Rule 23(b) because common issues of law or fact do not predominate over individual issues.
So here's a strategy in jurisdictions where a defeat of class certification may not work:
- In states where plaintiffs need not show individualized reliance/causation, they may still have to demonstrate that an objectively reasonable consumer would have been damaged by the marketing/advertising campaign.
- The Supreme Court in Iqbal/Twombly said that a court must disregard conclusory allegations and scrutinize the complaint's factual allegations to determine whether it nudges the alleged wrong-doing "across the line from conceivable to plausible." The complaint must have meat on its bones. In the case of a consumer fraud class complaint, plaintiffs’ counsel, to survive a motion to dismiss, should need to include references to evidence or other substantiation for the claim such as consumer surveys or perhaps a government finding.
- Without a strong factual basis as to how an "objectively reasonable consumer" might behave, consumer fraud/unfair trade practices putative class claims concerning the marketing of a food product may be in jeopardy. Defendants should take advantage and seek dismissal at the outset of the case.
Dismissal of "I Can't Believe It's Not Butter" Claims: Another Example of Iqbal/Twombly Succeeding Where Preemption Cannot
Judge James Ware dismissed on an FRCP 12(b)(6) motion putative class claims against Unilever alleging violations of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act , Unfair Competition Law, and False Advertising Law . Judge Ware's decision can be found here. Plaintiff alleged that Unilever misrepresented the ingredients of its butter-substitute product through its advertising and product labeling.
The heart of plaintiff's complaint was Unilever's marketing of the product as "Made with a Blend of Nutritious Oils." Plaintiff alleged that "[t]his message . . . is misleading and deceptive because Defendant's Product contains a highly unhealthy, non-nutritious oil known as partially hydrogenated oil."
Unilever's preemption argument was rejected. The court followed what's becoming a familiar line of reasoning that while federal law governs the labeling of the product, state advertising and marketing claims are not preempted:
Although the "oils" referred to in the advertisement on the label are the same oils that are subject to the NLEA labeling requirement, the Court finds that there is no inherent conflict in allowing relief under state law with respect to what is said in the advertisement on a label about characteristics of those oils that are not regulated by the NLEA.
Judge Ware dismissed the claims against Unilever on the basis of the plausibility pleading standards articulated by the Supreme Court in the Iqbal and Twombly cases. He ruled that plaintiff's claims concerning the oils were "conclusory" and explained that the "implausibility of Plaintiff's allegations can more readily be seen if the allegations are expressed as a categorical syllogism:"
For the representation "blend of nutritious oils" to be true, all constituent oils
must be nutritious. One of the constituent oils in the product [partially hydrogenated oil] is not nutritious. Therefore, the product representation is false.
The court went on to explain why plaintiff's claims, even if accepted as true, were implausible. The court found faulty the logic underlying plaintiff's complaint about the use of partially hydrogenated oil in the "blend of nutritious oils." The court found that plaintiff's argument suffered from (1) “petitio principii (begging the question)”, (2) the "fallacy of composition" and (3) the "fallacy of division." In short, the Unilever case demonstrates that without a solid scientific and factual basis, consumer fraud claims are frequently vulnerable to attack on an early motion to dismiss (though maybe not for preemption).
Court's Decision on CR 12(b)(6) Motion In Zupnik: FFDCA Preemption Under Further Attack and Twombly Ignored
We previously cited the motion to dismiss in Zupnik, et al. v. Tropicana Products, Inc. as an example of good pleading practice in a putative consumer fraud class case. United States District Judge Dale S. Fischer apparently disagreed with our assessment, this week issuing an order denying the motion.
Tropicana’s lead argument was a failure of pleading. Tropicana attacked the complaint both on the basis of Rule 9(b), and under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Twombly. The Twombly decision requires the federal court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to determine whether operative factual allegations are “plausible” and more than simply “conclusory.”
Judge Fischer rejected summarily Rule 9(b) arguments. She completely disregarded Tropicana’s Twombly arguments, failing even to mention the Supreme Court’s decision.
Tropicana also moved to dismiss based on federal preemption. Most of Judge Fischer’s decision is devoted to the preemption argument. She ruled that since California’s Sherman Law is substantively identical to 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) of the FFDCA, the preemption argument fails.
Judge Fischer theorized that even though plaintiffs could not point to anything on Tropicana’s label that violated any FDA regulation, the FDA could bring an enforcement action “to target specific false or misleading labels.” If the FDA can bring that kind of action under 21 U.S.C. § 343(a), plaintiffs, according to Judge Fischer, should also be able to bring a private right of action under the identical California law. Query whether Judge Fischer’s reasoning negates any FFDCA preemption defense to a claim brought under California’s Sherman Act?
Consumer Fraud Claims: Examples of Good and Bad Motion Practices
The Good: Tropicana recently brought a motion to dismiss the Zupnik putative consumer fraud class claims pending against it. Zupnik alleges that Tropicana misled consumers in the promotion of its “Pure 100% Juice Pomegranate Blueberry Flavored Blend of 5 Juices from Concentrate with other Natural Flavors” because its front label did not include pictures of fruits other than pomegranates and blueberries.
Tropicana’s motion, brought under both FRCP 9(b) and 12(b)(6), appears as a good example of how putative consumer class claims can be challenged at the outset of the case. Though we don’t yet know whether Tropicana will be successful, its pleading is a sharp attack on the plaintiff’s complaint and takes advantage of the heightened pleading requirements announced recently by the Supreme Court.
Tropicana moved on the basis that the complaint lacks particularity required under Rule 9(b) (the rule requires pleading of the “particularity of the fraud”). It also challenged whether the plaintiff had any injury in fact or alleged any reliance on particular advertising. Finally, Tropicana argued that Zupnik’s claims were expressly preempted by federal law.
Tropicana cites to Twombly to urge the court to disregard “plaintiffs legal conclusions . . . even when made, as here, in the guise of factual allegations.”
Tropicana also attacks Zupnik’s complaint on the basis that “she got what she paid for.” Tropicana points out that its product sold for far less than juice with a higher level of pomegranate or blueberry juices. Because she got what she paid for (presumably regardless of whether she understood it at the time of purchase), she lacks standing to bring a claim for consumer fraud.
The Bad: Coincidently, in another case involving a putative consumer fraud class claim over depictions of fruits on a label, Judge Gorton of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Wiley v. Gerber Products Company granted Gerber’s motion to transfer to the Southern District of California for consolidation with the Williams case pending in California. (The Williams case was previously discussed in this blog.)
The lesson from Wiley v Gerber: if your strategy is to avoid transfer of venue, think about this when pleading. For example, do not include allegations in the complaint about a nationwide class and the application of different states’ consumer protection laws.
Wiley argued against transfer, contending that the “Court’s familiarity with Massachusetts law, under which several claims are brought weights against transfer.” The problem is that “in her amended complaint, Wiley added several claims under New Jersey state law which only undermines her contention that this Court is especially competent to adjudicate the state laws at issue in this dispute.” Wiley also alleged a nationwide class. The court found that the plaintiff’s choice of forum mattered little when she alleged a nationwide class.
Hurdles Faced By Plaintiffs In Class Action Lawsuit for Sale and Marketing of Cold and Flu Medications Containing Vitamin C
By Guest Blogger Tyler Anderson
On November 2, we blogged about the FDA warning letter issued to Procter and Gamble for its unlawful marketing of Vicks cold and flu medications containing Vitamin C. On November 4, 2009, a putative class action lawsuit was filed against Procter and Gamble in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (Sixth Circuit) alleging Procter and Gamble violated federal and state consumer protection laws through false and misleading advertising practices regarding the two Vicks products mentioned in the FDA warning letter.
Regardless of the merits of their case, the plaintiffs in this action may have a hard time obtaining their desired relief. In Count 1 of the complaint, the plaintiffs allege Proctor and Gamble violated the consumer protection laws of 43 separate states. The Seventh Circuit’s holding in its Bridgestone/Firestone decision (J. Easterbrook) and its progeny, suggests that under FRCP 23(b)(3), such a class action is unmanageable. Courts point to the impracticability of one court applying the divergent laws of differing jurisdictions in circumstances such as those at bar.
“Plausibility” pleading standards (see recent discussion of Wright v. General Mills) present additional hurdles. Applying Twombly as the court did in the Wright case, to survive a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs would need to make plausible, non-conclusory allegations that the plaintiffs purchased the Vicks products because they contained Vitamin C and the cost of the product with the Vitamin C was greater than it would have been without. No such allegations exist here, so applying the holdings of Twombly and Wright to this claim indicates that it may be subject to dismissal.
“Reliance” may be yet another avenue to dismiss the action (at least in part). Many state consumer fraud statutes require reliance. This means that the plaintiffs would be required to show that each plaintiff in the action bought the product in reliance on the purported fraudulent statement. Because purchasing decisions are individual decisions, proving reliance on a class-wide basis would be an individual inquiry that would predominate over issues of fact common to the class, which would negate class treatment.
Preemption v. Plausibility: Will There Be More or Fewer Successful Consumer Fraud Suits?
Products Liability Law360 ran a piece this week entitled “Suits Over Deceptive Food Marketing Likely To Increase” (unfortunately, this is a subscription-only site) authored by Liz McKenzie. The article discusses rightly how increased FDA enforcement action may lead plaintiffs attorneys to file “piggy-back” putative class actions. For example, it took just 13 days following the FDA’s warning letter to General Mills concerning Cheerios for the first putative class suit to be filed.
Compounding increased FDA enforcement, recent rulings from the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit, like the Snapple Decision, have made it more difficult to assert a preemption defense in food cases in the absence of formal FDA rulemaking.
But, what one hand giveth the other taketh away. The hope for food companies is that that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal will negate the preemption decisions and effectively heighten the bar for consumer fraud claims related to product marketing. Dismissal for failure to meet the new “plausibility” pleading standard and not preemption is exactly how the District Court ruled in Wright v. General Mills. Wright involved a putative class complaint involving Nature’s Valley products sold as “100% Natural” “even though the products contained one or more non-natural or artificial ingredients such as high-fructose corn syrup (’HFCS’).”
In Wright, the court found defective, under the Iqbal/Twombly “plausibility” standard, the plaintiffs’ injury-in-fact allegation. The Wright court ruled that the injury-in-fact allegation “conclusory,” “sparse” and “defective.” The plaintiff alleged only that “Defendant caused Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase, purchase more of, or pay more for, these Nature Valley products.”
Following the Supreme Court's new standard of notice pleading and its application in the Wright case, query how any putative consumer fraud class complaint can survive a Rule 12 motion without having first completed market surveys or gathering of other evidence of consumer injury.
