A Tale of Two Orders

Two recent court orders in motions to dismiss consumer fraud class actions illustrate the fine lines that exist in the analytical process courts engage in when determining whether or not a claim may continue forward.

In Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied Diamond Foods' motion for dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff and other consumers in the class purchased the company’s shelled walnut products based on false claims of health benefits that consumption of the omega-3 fatty acids in walnuts provides. The complaint alleged (1) unfair competition, (2) false advertising, (3) violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act and (4) unjust enrichment.

Diamond Foods moved for dismissal on the basis that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the “FDCA”), as amended by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (the “NLEA”). The court found that the plaintiff’s claims were not expressly preempted on the plain language of the NLEA’s preemption clause, and further that the plaintiff’s unfair competition claims were based on California’s Sherman Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law, not the FDCA. The court also held that the plaintiff’s claims were not impliedly preempted, as Congress expressly stated its intent that the NLEA was not to be construed to preempt any provision of state law, unless such provision is expressly preempted under section 403A of the FDCA. As such, the plaintiff’s claims were allowed to move forward.

However, in Loreto v. Procter & Gamble, the background and core issues of which we blogged about here and here, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted Procter & Gamble’s motion for dismissal, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. The plaintiffs alleged that Procter & Gamble violated consumer fraud statutes in New Jersey and all other states and the District of Columbia through false and misleading advertising practices involving Vick’s DayQuil Cold and Flu Symptom Relief Plus Vitamin C and Vick’s NyQuil Cold and Flu Symptom Relief Plus Vitamin C.

The court initially held that the plaintiffs, residents of New Jersey, lacked standing to pursue any claims under any state consumer protection statute other than that of New Jersey. Next, the court agreed with Procter & Gamble’s contention that despite presenting their cause of action in the form of a claim under the consumer protection statutes of New Jersey and other states, the plaintiffs’ cause of action was in actuality an improper attempt to assert a private right of action under the FDCA. Finally, the court held that even if it were to assume the plaintiff’s claims were not an improper attempt to assert a private right of action under the FDCA, the plaintiff’s claims merited dismissal as the alleged no actual injury, failed to allege causation, and otherwise failed to assert other essential elements of the individual state consumer law causes of action. The court, holding that the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to amend their complaint on notice of Procter & Gamble’s positions and failed to address the pleading deficiencies in their amended complaint, ultimately found that dismissal with prejudice was warranted.

"I Can't Believe It's Not Implausible" - Iqbal/Twombly Doctrine Does Not Result in Dismissal of Yumul Claims

As our own Ken Odza recently blogged, the plausibility pleading standard articulated by the Supreme Court in the Iqbal and Twombly cases resulted recently in the FRCP 12(b)(6) dismissal of misrepresentation claims against Unilever. That ruling seemed to indicate that consumer fraud claims would be vulnerable to motions for dismissal. However, in an order granting in part and denying in part the defendant’s motion for dismissal in Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California did not apply the plausibility pleading standard as stringently as the court in the Unilever decision, lending some question as to precisely how far Iqbal and Twombly will reach.

In Yumul, the plaintiffs alleged Smart Balance violated the California Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act. These exact same violations were alleged in the Unilever case. In Yumul, the plaintiffs alleged that Smart Balance misled consumers with its marketing of Nucoa margarine as “cholesterol free” and “healthy,” despite the presence of artificial trans fat in the product.

In addressing Smart Balance’s motion for dismissal, the court noted the plaintiffs’ reliance on the delayed discovery exception in support of its assertion that tolling of the statute of limitations was appropriate. Stating the applicable law, the court offered that:

A plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer.

In its order, the court directed the plaintiffs to specify the manner of discovery (how and when the plaintiffs actually discovered the fraud or mistake) within 14 days of the July 30 order in an amended complaint. The court denied Smart Balance’s motion to dismiss on all other grounds. While this is no guarantee of success for the plaintiffs by any means, the decision of the court not to dismiss the allegations in Yumul on the basis of the plausibility pleading standard under Iqbal and Twombly stands as an example of the type of inconsistency we may see as courts attempt to apply the standard. We will continue to closely follow this case.

Court Cuts Back Claims In Great Pomegranate Dispute

By Guest Blogger Jay Eckhardt

In a dispute over product labeling and marketing, the Coca-Cola Company avoids liability as a result of its careful compliance with FDA rules.  (Also, see Rick's post from last week, regarding Coca-Cola's victory in a dispute over its original formula label found on Coke® Classic.)  But pomegranate champion POM Wonderful can still pursue a Lanham Act  deceptive advertising claim against the company.

On May 5 the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California issued summary judgment orders that cut out two of POM's claims against  Coca-Cola's "Minute Maid Enhanced Pomegranate Blueberry Flavored 100% Juice Blend."  (Download a copy of the Central District of California's Order here.) 

The court acknowledged that consumers have griped about the emphasis on pomegranate and blueberry in the Minute Maid product labeling and advertising.  (See Ken's post about a consumer class action concerning Tropicana's pomegranate blueberry juice blend here.)  Still, the court agreed with Coca-Cola that POM could not bring a Lanham Act claim challenging the product name, because the company complied with FDA labeling requirements.  The Minute Maid product contains less than one-half of one percent (0.5%) pomegranate and blueberry juice, but the court determined that the name is compliant with FDA rules, which allow for product names that prominently cite ingredients that are less than prominent in volume.  Because the label clearly notes that the juice is "flavored" with pomegranate and blueberry juice and that the juice is a "blend" of several juices, the court held that the name complies with applicable FDA regulations (21 C.F.R. §§ 102.33(c) and 101.22(i)(1)(i)).  

A second claim raised by POM was thrown out by the court.  POM sought restitution under California Business & Professions Code section 17200, which provides a cause of action for "Unfair Competition."  The court dismissed this claim because "restitution" has been narrowly interpreted by the California Supreme Court, thus barring POM's claim for recovery of a "lost business opportunity."  Among authorities cited for the decision to dismiss this claim, the court reported that POM's similar claims under California's Unfair Competition law, brought against Tropicana and Welch's, have recently been dismissed in separate actions.

A third claim survived Coca-Cola's summary judgment attack.  POM may proceed under the Lanham Act to challenge the marketing and advertising for the "blueberry pomegranate" product.  The court held that POM may attempt to prove at trial that advertising and marketing actually deceived customers, or that Coca-Cola willfully and intentionally misled customers with the marketing of its product.

As noted from the court's order, Coca-Cola is not the only target of POM's litigation strategy.  Other juice makers, Tropicana and Welch's, have been the focus of POM's efforts to defend its niche.  Ken reported on POM's challenge to Ocean Spray's pomegranate cranberry juice blend last August, when POM survived Ocean Spray's initial motion to dismiss all claims. 

An inspired marketing campaign for POM's products, and its essential ingredient, helped build the pomegranate franchise.  It's hard to say whether litigation against advertising and labeling practices of POM's pomegranate competitors will be effective.  At the same time, there's no doubt that POM is well aware of the burdens of FDA labeling regulations – the company was one among 17 companies notified by the FDA last February that its product labeling and advertising did not pass muster.  The FDA warned POM that its advertising was suspect, based on the health claims made on its web site about the benefits of pomegranate juice. 

Froot Loops Litigation: An Endless Loop for Kellogg's?

Just over forty years ago, Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young came out with their Déja Vu album. Attorneys at Kellogg USA are undoubtedly thinking, “We have all been here before.” 

Froot Loops pre-dated Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young.  I remember taking the Kellogg's factory tour in Battle Creek and being handed an individual-sized packet at the end of the tour, even before they hit the market.  I was seven years old, but I knew they were cereal not fruit.  Apparently, some other people think otherwise.

 

Ken has already blogged about the related, and dismissed, Crunchberry lawsuit.  At the ABA Business Law Section Spring Meeting last weekend, my friend Teresa Harmon Wilton mentioned the Crunchberry case in her annual round-up of commercial law cases, and mentioned that the decision was based on the prior Froot Loops case.  I looked down at my Blackberry, and that's when I realized there was an old Froot Loops case but I had just got notice of a new one. 

 

Two old ones, actually.

 

In 2007, the United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed a claim against Kellogg USA for violations of various California statutes and common law causes of action based on the claim that Froot Loops do not contain fruit. 

 

In 2009, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed a claim against Kellogg USA for violations of various California statutes and common law causes of action based on the claim that Froot Loops do not contain fruit.

 

On April 19, a complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Kellogg USA for violations of various California statutes and common law causes of action based on the claim that Froot Loops do not contain fruit.
 

There is clearly a pattern here. I would note that there is only one other federal court district in California, the Southern District in San Diego. Unless I missed a case there.

 

In the McKinniss case, the court dismissed claims for:

In the Videtto case, the court dismissed claims for:

  • Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law
  • Violation of the California False Advertising Law
  • Violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act
  • Intentional Misrepresentation
  • Breach of Implied Warranties

In the Werbel complaint, plaintiff seeks damages for:

  • Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law
  • Violation of the California False Advertising Law
  • Violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act
  • Intentional Misrepresentation
  • Breach of Implied Warranties

Each complaint referenced a study by the Strategic Alliance for Healthy Food and Activity Environments that found that foods it claimed suggested the presence of fruit did not in fact contain fruit. The courts have so far not cared much for this study, which doesn’t in any way demonstrate that anyone could be misled by the actual advertising on the package.

 

Raise your hand if you’re surprised at the fact that the same attorneys brought all three cases. Under our justice system, a plaintiff is not bound by the decision of a court to which he or she was not a party. An attorney is held to a different standard under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  It will be interesting to see if there is anything that comes from expecting the same conditions to lead to a different outcome.

 

Opening the Door to More Litigation Between Food Companies? See POM v. Ocean Spray Decision

False advertising claims under the Lanham Act and corresponding state law claims for food companies can be tough going. Many intersect issues regulated by the FDA under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). No private right of enforcement of the FDA regulations exists. Only the FDA is allowed to bring a legal action to enforce its regulations. Lanham Act claims are generally barred where private litigants ask the court to determine preemptively how the FDA will interpret its own regulations.

Now comes the recent decision in POM Wonderful LLC v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. POM is aggrieved because Ocean Spray markets pomegranate and cranberry blended juices though, according to POM, the juices are “almost entirely comprised of apple and grape juice.” POM is alleging Lanham Act false advertising claims and California state law false advertising and unfair competition claims.

The court denied a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Threading the needle, the Court found that the claims were not seeking FFDCA enforcement. According the Court, POM’s claims are not for “mislabeling,” but for false advertising and promotion. The court determined it would not have to interpret FDA regulations and that “POM’s Lanham Act claim ‘extend beyond the packaging and name . . . to its advertising and marketing including . . . website.” Applying similar logic, the court found that the FFDCA did not preempt POM’s state law claims.

Lesson from the POM court: Whether one food company can bring false advertising claims against another depends in part on whether a court believes that the claims are focused on non-FFDCA-regulated issues such as advertising,  websites, social media or other marketing efforts.

Bottled Water Association Sues Over Water Bottle Ads

The International Bottled Water Association (IBWA) is taking aim at an advertising campaign for Eco Canteen stainless steel water bottles, claiming the ads wrongly suggest that plastic water bottles are unhealthy and unsafe.

In a lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, IBWA claims that Eco Canteen’s television ads and content on various Eco Canteen websites deceive the public into believing that single-serve and reusable plastic water bottles constitute a safety and health risk to consumers. Among other things, IBWA’s lawsuit alleges that some of Eco Canteen’s ads have:

  • Improperly linked plastic water bottles to breast and prostate cancer and stated that plastic water bottles “could be poisoning you and your family”;
     
  • Matched images of single-serve plastic water bottles with Eco Canteen’s claims “relating to an organic compound called Bisphenol A (BPA) with the intent to confuse consumers into believing that single-serve bottles also contain BPA even though they do not”;
     
  • Conveyed false and misleading information regarding the alleged health risks of BPA; and
     
  • Suggested that exposing certain water bottles to warm temperatures can lead to leaching of chemicals.
     

IBWA brings two claims against Eco Canteen: (i) a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125; and (ii) an unfair competition claim under North Carolina law. A copy of the complaint (including exhibits showing some of the Eco Canteen ads about which IBWA complains) is available here.