Sodium Putative Class Action Suits to Become Epidemic?
Following the putative class suit filed last month in New Jersey by the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) against Denny’s, a similar suit was filed in Illinois (apparently CSPI is not directly involved in this action). The Illinois complaint can be found here.
Like the New Jersey complaint, the Illinois action alleges claims of consumer fraud and breach of implied warranty of merchantability. Previous posts on this site have explained why both consumer fraud and implied warranty of merchantability claims should fail on their face.
The Illinois action adds claims for unjust enrichment, accounting and ”breach of contract implied in fact.” Claims for unjust enrichment and accounting seem intertwined and not all that different from consumer fraud and breach of implied warranty claims.
Breach of contract implied in fact is more creative. Instead of directly attacking Denny's representations (which as discussed in previous posts are not really alleged to be inaccurate), this claim asserts something that looks more like a products liability claim. The claim turns not so much on “fraud” but on whether the meals sold “contained excessive amounts of sodium, such that it was not fit for human consumption.” This cause of action alleges that the “bargained for” contract between class members and Denny’s required Denny’s to provide “a meal fit for human consumption.”
While creative, the breach of contract implied in fact claim may be more problematic than the fraud and implied warranty of merchantability claims. First, as discussed previously, Denny’s discloses on its website (and according to CSPI, at its restaurants) sodium content of menu items. Like the fraud claims, proof that plaintiffs could have reasonably bargained for something different seems problematic.
Second, plaintiffs are asking the court to use its equitable powers and step into the shoes of local, state and federal health departments and regulatory agencies to pass on appropriate sodium levels in restaurant food. As a rule, courts use their equitable powers only in extraordinary circumstances (e.g., a building falls down, assets leave the country, an individual’s life or liberties at stake, etc.). If regulators and legislators have not reached consensus on regulating sodium, odds are that most judges will avoid weighing in on the issue.
Despite their problems (and probable lack of merit), best guess is that the plaintiffs' class action bar will continue copy-catting these suits across the country. Doubtful that Denny's will be the only victim.
Snapple Decision - FDA's Policy Concerning Use of "Natural" Not Entitled to Preemptive Effect
High Fructose Corn Syrup Labeling: Opening the Floodgates For Consumer HFCS Claims?
The Third Circuit ruled this week in Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., reversing the district court and reinstating the state law putative class claims for consumer fraud and breach of warranty for use of the term “all natural” despite the inclusion of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) (though the court noted that the manufacturer no longer uses HFCS in its products).
The case is significant and is getting attention because the Third Circuit concluded that “FDA’s policy statement regarding the term ‘natural’ is not entitled to preemptive effect.” The court was persuaded because “the FDA declined to adopt a formal definition of the term ‘natural’ choosing instead to simply enforce its long standing ‘informal policy’”:
[T]he agency has considered “natural” to mean that nothing artificial or synthetic (including colors regardless of source) is included in, or has been added to, the product that would not normally be expected to be there. For example, the addition of beet juice to lemonade to make it pink would preclude the product being called “natural.”
As expected, the court followed its previous ruling in Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafood, LLC (our blog entry about it is here), ruling that neither the FDA’s “informal policy” nor their enforcement letters were entitled to any preemptive weight.
Practice Tip: For the next HFCS case, preemption may not be a dead issue. The Third Circuit did not rule (though it expressed its skepticism) on the “express preemption” argument based on 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(3). The court ducked the issue by concluding that Snapple waived the argument by not “advancing it” in the district court.
